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ABSTRACT: Post-apartheid South Africa placed universal access and service at the forefront of its communications policy and regulatory interventions from 1996. 
It followed global best practice by imposing universal service obligations on licensees by establishing a universal service fund and a dedicated universal access 
regulatory body, as well as awarding targeted operator licences in areas of low teledensity. The effectiveness of these interventions is open to question, with fixed-
line teledensity falling and prepaid customers in the mobile sector now accounting for the overwhelming majority of telephony users nationwide. Starting with an 
overview of South Africa’s universal access and service imperative, this paper assesses the value and effectiveness of these universal access and service interventions. 
It shows how the burgeoning access to mobile has little to do with the impact of these interventions. Finally, the implications of this for universal access and service 
policy and regulation, and for its implementation, are considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Telecommunications reform in South Africa was accompanied by a strong policy commitment to achieving 
universal access and service (UAS). This resulted in a number of specific interventions designed to extend access to 
telecommunications services, largely informed by global best practice (Blackman & Srivastava, 2011; infoDev, 2009; 
Intven, 2000; ITU, 1998; SADC, 2011). Many of these, however, are regarded with scepticism, or are seen as having 
failed (Gillwald, 2006; Hodge, 2004; Perry, 2010). Yet at the same time, South Africa’s mobile teledensity has soared 
to 67 million active SIM-cards in a population of 52 million (MTN, 2013; Tarrant, 2013; Telkom, 2013; Vodacom, 
2013), which translates into 126% teledensity, though per capita user penetration is lower2 . This increase is arguably 
despite, rather than because of, targeted UAS interventions, and is largely attributable to the runaway growth 
of prepaid mobile. The UAS concept has a lengthy pedigree (Mueller, 1997). Current usage distinguishes between 
widespread access at the individual/household level (universal service) versus widespread access via public facilities 
such as payphones (universal access), adopting ‘universal access and service (UAS)’ as a portmanteau policy term 
(Blackman & Srivastava, 2011, pp. 153-154).
A critical assessment of South Africa’s UAS policy and practice in relation to global best practice, in order to 
identify impacts and to account for shortcomings, is therefore necessary. The lessons from such an analysis will 
be of value not only for developing countries still designing and implementing UAS interventions for telephony 
and Internet services, but also for those contemplating UAS interventions in relation to national broadband plans. 
South Africa is presently engaged in a full review of ICT sector policy and development of a new broadband policy, 
both of which include UAS interventions. Namibia has recently adopted a national UAS policy which foresees 
broadband interventions.
Firstly, this article shows why UAS has been a central pillar in South Africa’s telecommunications reform. Secondly, it 
documents the key components of consequent UAS interventions: the imposition of universal service obligations on licensees, 
the establishment of a dedicated agency to deal with UAS issues and a universal service fund, and the awarding of licences 
in areas of low teledensity. Next, an assessment of each of these UAS interventions is undertaken leading to a conclusion.
BACKGROUND
South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 and its subsequent engagement with telecommunications reform 
took place against the background of an increasing interest in UAS as a central sector reform issue (Hudson, 1994), 
and in the context of a racially discriminatory history of systematic denial of access to telecommunications services 
for the majority of the population. Hence, in the policy guideline on telecommunications, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) emphasises the racial distortions to access under apartheid: 
For black people it is estimated that less than 1 (fixed telephone) line per 100 persons is in place compared 
with about 60 (fixed telephone) lines per 100 white persons. Other countries with comparable per capita 
wealth have 30 lines per 100 persons. The situation is far worse in rural areas (ANC, 1994). 
1	 This	article	was	developed	from	a	2010	paper	presented	at	the	International	Telecommunications	Society	Conference	‘Telecommunications:	Ubiquity	and	
equity	in	a	broadband	environment’,	Wellington,	New	Zealand.
2	 The	 teledensity	 figure	 includes	 SIMs	 used	 for	 3G	 data,	 machine-to-machine	 communications	 and	 telemetry,	 and	 does	 not	 account	 for	 multiple	 SIM	
ownership.
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The RDP acknowledges the role of telecommunications as an “indispensable backbone for the development of all 
other socio-economic sectors”, and commits the country to “provide universal affordable access for all as rapidly as 
possible within a sustainable and viable telecommunications system” (ANC, 1994).
This recognition of a deeply racialised communications divide finds further expression in the objectives of the White 
Paper on Telecommunications which emerged from the post-1994 telecoms reform process: “Our particular goal is to 
balance the provision of basic universal service in telecommunications to disadvantaged rural and urban communities 
with the delivery of advanced information services capable of meeting the needs of a growing South African economy” 
(RSA, 1996a, p. 1). The Telecommunications Act 1996 likewise lists the intent to “promote the universal and affordable 
provision of telecommunication services” (RSA, 1996b, 2(a)) foremost among its 17 objectives. With the passage of 
the Electronic Communications Act (RSA, 2005), by which time substantial strides had been made towards securing 
universal access to telecommunications services, this overarching goal of universal affordable access was modified to 
a less strongly formulated commitment to “promote the universal provision of electronic communications networks 
and electronic communications services and connectivity for all” (RSA 2005 2(c)). This vision of “universal affordable 
access for all” animated subsequent regulatory interventions (Hodge, 2004; Msimang, 2006) over the critical transition 
years post-democracy towards a reformed communications environment.
SOUTH AFRICA’S UNIVERSAL ACCESS AND SERVICE INTERVENTIONS
We now turn to a brief overview and assessment of each of the universal service and access interventions 
adopted in South Africa. The discussion reveals strengths and weaknesses with respect to each component of 
policy and its implementation.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS (USOS)
The imposition of USOs is widely considered a standard best practice component of UAS implementation (Blackman 
& Srivastava, 2011; infoDev, 2009; Intven, 2000; ITU, 1998) and comprises “mandatory service obligations … imposed 
by licence conditions or other regulatory measures” (Intven, 2000, p. 6-3) either on individual operators or on a class 
of operators. USOs typically take the form of requirements to supply certain types of ICT services to defined classes 
of customers. Examples include: connecting additional fixed-line customers, installing more public payphones, or 
providing mobile network coverage to specified geographic areas or proportions of population (Intven, 2000, pp. 6-11), 
but they can also include other obligations such as the carriage of free emergency calls. In essence, USOs are an 
enforced internal cross-subsidy from more lucrative market segments to non-profitable services and areas.
In South Africa, the licence issued to the fixed line incumbent operator, Telkom, specified a number of USO rollout 
targets over the period 1997-2002. The focus was largely on additional access lines, mainly in “under-serviced areas” 
and to “priority customers” (defined as hospitals, libraries, local authorities or schools), but also dealt with the 
installation of public payphones (Table 1). The licence included an extensive list of under-serviced areas (RSA, 1997).
 
South Africa was relatively unusual in including USOs for its mobile operators, an approach the ITU still urges as 
best practice today (ITU, 2008, p. 36). Along with the imposition of network geographic and population coverage 
requirements, the USO requirements for mobile focused on “community service telephones” – essentially a public 
payphone on the mobile network “freely accessible” to the “general public” (ICASA, 2002a, p. 5) – with slightly 
differentiated requirements across the three licensees. Additional obligations were imposed on MTN and Vodacom in 
2004 in return for access to additional spectrum (ICASA, 2004a; ICASA, 2004b). These took the form of requirements 
to distribute free SIM-cards and handsets, as well as provision of Internet access to public schools and to institutions 
for people with disabilities, and were later extended to Cell C (ICASA, 2009a; ICASA, 2009b) (see Table 1).
The licensing of South Africa’s second PSTS operator, NeoTel, was accompanied by the imposition of a hybrid range 
of USOs. These included defined coverage rollout targets similar to those imposed on mobile operators, according to a 
“confidential” rollout timetable, as well as the provision of community access in the form of high-speed Internet access 
to schools and clinics, reflecting ongoing shifts in the communications landscape (Table 1).
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TABLE 1:  UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON LICENSED OPERATORS IN SA
Operator Access lines Coverage
Payphones/community access 
points
Telkom
(PSTS)
2 690 000 over five years
-  1 676 000 in under-serviced areas
-  20 246 to hospitals, libraries, local 
authorities, schools
-  3 204 to under-serviced areas, 
villages
N/A 120 000 public payphones over five years
Vodacom
(Mobile)
N/A
60% of population within two years
70% of population within four years
Timetable for specified coverage areas
22 000 community service telephones in 70 specified 
areas over five years
- 1 250 000 SIM-card connection packages
- 125 000 handsets
-  140 institutions for people with dis-
abilities provided with Internet access (10 
terminals each) over three years
-  5 000 public schools provided with 
Internet access over eight years
-  (subject to approval of implementation 
plan)
MTN
(Mobile) N/A
60% of population within two years
70% of population within four years
Timetable for specified coverage areas
7 500 community service telephones over five years
- 1 250 000 SIM-card connection packages
- 125 000 handsets
-  140 institutions for people with dis-
abilities provided with Internet access (10 
terminals each) over three years
-  5 000 public schools provided with 
Internet access over eight years
-  (subject to approval of implementation 
plan)
Cell C
(Mobile)
N/A
40% of area within 1 year (roaming)
8% of area within five years (own network)
80% of population within one year (roaming)
60% of population within five years (own network)
52 000 community service telephones in under-serviced 
areas (with less than 10% fixed teledensity)
- 1 250 000 SIM-card connection packages
- 125 000 handsets
-  140 institutions for people with dis-
abilities provided with Internet access (10 
terminals each) over three years
-  5 000 public schools provided with 
Internet access over eight years
-  (subject to approval of implementation 
plan)
NeoTel
(PSTS)
N/A
60% of population in defined metropolitan areas 
within five years
80% of population within 10 years
Subject to “confidential” “Rollout Timetable”
Establish and maintain “high speed Internet connectivity” 
to: 
 - 2 500 public schools / education institutions
 - 2 500 public rural clinics
Subject to approved implementation plan
	 Compiled	from:		 RSA,	1997;	ICASA,	2001;	ICASA,	2002a;	ICASA,	2002b;	ICASA,	2004a;	ICASA,	2004b;	ICASA,	2006;	ICASA,	2009a;	ICASA,	2009b
UNIVERSAL SERVICE AGENCY (USA)
The creation of a specialised agency in 1996, the Universal Service Agency (USA), with a mandate to focus 
on issues pertaining to UAS (RSA, 1996b, Ch. 8), reflects an early, ground-breaking structural intervention 
(Msimang, 2006, p. 225)3.  It reflected the commitment to ensuring universal affordable access to telecommunications 
for all citizens, in particular the historically disadvantaged black majority. 
The mandate of the Agency dealt with a variety of objectives, many of them rather vague:
(a) promote the goal of universal service;
(b) encourage, facilitate and offer guidance in respect of any scheme to provide … [UAS] …;
(c) foster the adoption and use of new methods of attaining [UAS]; 
(d) stimulate public awareness of the benefits of telecommunication services. 
              (RSA, 1996b, Section 59 (1)).
3	 Intelecon	(2009,	p.	2)	identifies	three	other	similarly	separate	entities,	all	established	several	years	after	the	USA.
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The USA was further required to assist the Minister in formalising definitions for UAS, as well as undertake research, 
make investigations, issue information and table recommendations relating to UAS (RSA 1996b, Sections 59 (2) and 
(3)). Most importantly, the USA was put in charge of the administration of the Universal Service Fund (RSA, 1996b, 
Section 65 (4)). This is contrary to international best practice. A 2009 report notes the overwhelming majority of funds 
as placed under the control of the regulator (Intelecon, 2009).
UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND (USF)
The creation of a dedicated fund (USF) to finance interventions to increase access to telecommunications services and 
to bridge the digital divide has for some time been considered best practice UAS policy (ITU, 1998, pp. 91, 2; Intven, 
2000; ITU, 2003). Conventionally, such a fund aggregates monies to support the promotion of UAS. Funds are usually 
sourced by levying a tax on operators (and hence on users), requiring them to contribute a small, defined percentage 
of revenue. The fund is then applied by a variety of means towards interventions targeted at increasing access for 
disadvantaged groups and in under-serviced areas, thereby providing a more effective, targeted cross-subsidy from 
revenue-generating services to uneconomic ones (Intven, 2000, pp. 6-22ff; Msimang, 2006, p. 224, ITU, 2011, p. 8ff).
In South Africa, the Telecommunications Act provided for the establishment of such a fund to be administered by the 
USA, a USF to be “utilised exclusively for the payment of subsidies … for the assistance of needy persons towards 
the cost … of telecommunication services” and, in certain circumstances, to subsidise the “extension of [the PSTS] to 
areas and communities which are not served or not adequately served” (RSA, 1996b, 66 (1) (a) & (b)). Contributions 
to the fund were initially set by Ministerial policy directive, and later regulated by ICASA (2008).
UNDER-SERVICED AREA LICENSEES (USALS)
A fourth potentially innovative approach to the provision of access was introduced under the 2001 amendments to 
the Telecommunications Act. The amendments introduced a new category of under-serviced area licensees (USALs), 
designed to allow “small businesses” to provide a range of telecommunication services (including VoIP (Voice over 
Internet Protocol) and “fixed-mobile”4 ) in areas “where there is teledensity of less than 5%”. It was further intended 
that “historically disadvantaged groups”, including women, would benefit from the award of such licences (RSA, 
1996b, Section 40A).
Msimang (2006, p. 241) and Thornton (2006, p. 4) have noted that participation of small business in providing 
telecommunications services was foreseen in the White Paper (RSA, 1996a), but the inspiration for this form of 
licensing may also have derived from the experience of telecommunications cooperatives in the United States, as 
the NTCA was a lobbyist in the process leading up to the 2001 amendment (NTCA, 2001). The model may also owe 
something to the experiments in rural payphone licensing undertaken in Chile and other jurisdictions in South 
America (Wellenius, 2002).
Subsequent to this amendment, the Minister specified 27 areas as under-serviced, based on fixed-line teledensity figures. 
The regulator then ran a series of licensing processes, leading to the initial award of seven USALs in 2004/5 (Figure 
1), with an additional seven licences awarded in 2007, this time using the licensing categories of the new Act (Senne, 
2008a). To support these new licensees, a contribution of R5 million per annum over three years was earmarked to be 
provided from the USF. There were also discussions around providing business development support and instituting 
regulatory measures, such as asymmetrical interconnection, to ensure a viable business case (Gillwald, 2006, p. 8ff).
4	 Defined	as	call	mobility	that	does	“not	permit	call	handover	between	cells”	(RSA,	1996,	(1)).
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FIGURE 1:  FIRST SEVEN UNDER-SERVICED AREA LICENSEES
 
																								Source:		 	Human	Sciences	Research	Council,	no	date
ASSESSING SOUTH AFRICA’S UAS INTERVENTIONS
Taken together, the provisions outlined above demonstrate South Africa’s commitment to giving UAS a central place 
in policy and regulation, and to aligning implementation with global best practice. Given this commitment, it is 
important to consider the degree to which the various interventions have been successful in meeting their objectives. 
It is not only a question of whether the level of access has increased: undoubtedly it has. The assessment also needs 
to consider whether each of these interventions contributed towards that goal, the extent of that contribution, and 
its impact on access in practice.
Two of the interventions (USOs and the USF) constitute mainstream thinking, while the USA and the USALs were less 
conventional, but by no means far removed from similar interventions elsewhere. An examination of the effectiveness 
of each may shed light on the effectiveness of policy implementation, and provide guidance for policymakers and 
regulators elsewhere, serving to enrich an understanding of global best practice.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS (USOS) 
It seems clear from the pattern of obligations imposed on the incumbent, Telkom, and on the mobile licensees, 
Vodacom and MTN, that the expectation was for fixed-line operators to shoulder the greatest burden in providing 
access to under-serviced areas (Table 1). However, the imposition of targets on Telkom has had almost no net effect on 
fixed-line penetration (Figure 2), despite considerable cost and much wasted effort. In the words of one analyst, it has 
merely demonstrated the “failure of the universal service policy” (Hodge, 2004, p. 5). Telkom installed 2,67 million 
lines between 1998 and 2002, falling only marginally short of its rollout targets (ICASA, 2010, p. 5). However, most 
of these new connections – 2 003 million – were disconnected, with early indications that this was due to the inability 
of subscribers to pay for the services acquired under the USO rollout (Hodge, 2004). Migrating such customers to 
prepaid fixed-line, or simply cutting outgoing calls, seems never to have been considered.
Additional reasons for this decline in fixed line access includes fixed-mobile substitution as users migrated to prepaid 
mobile packages that were easier and cheaper to acquire, and more apposite for low-income users (Hodge, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the shift does suggest a failure of fixed-line USO policy.
The trends are clearly evident in the increase and decline in fixed lines over the period 1997 to 2013 (Figure 2). 
Despite an initial upsurge in the subscriber base as Telkom sought to meet its USO targets, the numbers steadily 
declined from a peak of 5,,5 million in 2000 to 3,8 million in 2013. The proportion of residential post-paid subscribers 
also declined, from 40,1% in 2002 to 30,8% in 2009.
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FIGURE 2:  SA: FIXED LINES (1997-2013)
 
	 Source:	 	Telkom,	1998-2013	Annual	Reports	
It is ironic that the mobile operators, on whom no specific subscriber rollout targets were imposed, exceeded all 
growth expectations, rendering USOs in respect of network coverage superfluous. By 2001 there were already more 
mobile subscribers than fixed lines in South Africa. The market share of mobile has continued to grow (Figure 3), 
reaching a total of 51,4 million in 2009, an order of magnitude greater than fixed-line penetration.
FIGURE 3:  SA: MOBILE SUBSCRIBERS (1999-2013) 5
	 Source:		 Author’s	own	data,	compiled	from	annual	Reports	of	MTN	and	Vodacom,	and	Cell	C	press	statements	
Community access is a similarly mixed picture. Telkom easily met its payphone target, reaching 195 000 payphones 
in 2002, but the numbers steadily fell to 132 000 by 2009. This may be partly due to payphone vandalism and to 
increased competition from mobile community service telephones (CSTs). By contrast, the mobile operators all met 
the CST component of their USO rollout targets (Msimang, 2006, p. 235; ICASA, 2010), which were exceptionally low, 
based on an estimated total market of less than a million consumers.
5	 The	dip	 in	numbers	 in	2011	 is	 likely	due	 to	 the	 introduction	of	 compulsory	 registration	of	SIM	ownership	under	RICA	 (Regulation	of	 Interception	of	
Communications	and	Provision	of	Communication-Related	Information	Act).
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Indeed, these CST targets were substantially exceeded. Vodacom, the only operator to specify CST numbers in its 
annual results, lists 118 000 CSTs in 2009, with MTN reporting 22 000 to ICASA (2010, p. 7), and Cell C thought 
to have rolled out 100 000 (Jones, 2008). There has been considerable difficulty verifying and coordinating this 
rollout, with each operator proceeding in accordance with its own interpretation of its obligations (Msimang, 2006, 
p. 235). The legal wrangle between mobile operators over CSTs was partly over the location of the rollout, but also 
suggests that the ability to arbitrage the low termination rates applicable to call traffic from such phones incentivises 
operators to exceed their obligations and maximise CST rollout (Jones, 2008).
The effectiveness of South Africa’s USOs is, therefore, open to question, with fixed-line teledensity continuing to fall, 
and with prepaid customers in the mobile sector now accounting for the overwhelming majority of telephony users 
and public access points nationwide. Rather than regulatory intervention, it is market forces that have undermined 
the fixed-line USOs and caused the mobile operators to exceed their USOs by several orders of magnitude.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE AGENCY (USA)
Despite its importance as an institutional intervention aimed at placing UAS at the forefront of telecommunications 
policy, the USA has struggled to make an impact.
This is partly due to structural issues created by complex lines of reporting and accountability between the Agency, 
the Minister, and the regulator (RSA 1996b, Sections 59 and 66). For example, until recently, several attempts by the 
USA to produce the required UAS definitions foundered because the Minister, rather than the Agency, is required to 
gazette them. Statutory appointment procedures place the USA under close control by the Minister, who also directs 
the Agency in the expenditure of the USF. As Limpitlaw comments: 
… from a regulatory point of view the Agency is very awkwardly positioned and it is not surprising that its 
track record of meeting its aims is extremely poor. It occupies a bizarre regulatory space, answerable to both 
ICASA and the Minister” (2004, p. 5255). 
An internal report similarly describes the Agency as “weakly embedded in South Africa’s regulatory space” 
(USA, 2005, p. 20) and points to a legal mandate that has consistently “undermined the independence of the Agency” 
(USA, 2005, p. 94).
The USA has been widely and consistently criticised for poor performance and ineffective management. The same 
report catalogues a damning litany of failures, including poor “management and accounting practices” coupled 
with lack of “human resource capacity”, a “chronic lack of funding”, engagement in “activities [not] consistent with 
the Agency’s mandate”, neglect of “core functions … to monitor and analyze the RSA telecom sector”, failure to 
“prepare, submit or otherwise comply with statutory reporting requirements”, undertaking project implementation 
without “mandate or authority” (USA, 2005, pp. 93-4). The organisation has been implicated in allegations of ongoing 
maladministration and corruption (see for example UDM, 2013).
Despite the structural contradictions and poor track record described above, and in the face of the initial vision of 
the Agency’s mandate as transitional and temporary (Msimang, 2006, p. 231), the USA was not absorbed within the 
sector regulator, as some had recommended, in either the 2001 amendments to the Telecommunications Act or in 
the Electronic Communications Act 2005. In fact, there was little substantive change to the role and functions of the 
body, apart from increased adherence to the policy fiat and direction of the Minister, and a cosmetic title change to 
“Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa” (RSA, 2005, Ch. 14). The oversight role of a board appointed 
by the Minister (introduced by the 2001 amendment to strengthen governance) was continued, and administration of 
the renamed “Universal Service and Access Fund” perpetuated, subject to many of the same accountability tensions 
between Agency, Minister and regulator (RSA, 2005, sections 87, 88) described above.
The Agency established in ground-breaking fashion to spearhead UAS interventions has thus ultimately proved 
ineffectual.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND (USF) 
The Universal Service Fund, closer to best practice, may be thought to have had a better track record. Certainly 
contributions were collected and funds were expended. Contribution levels were initially set at 0,16% of operator 
revenue, and later raised to 0.2%. The fund was initially capped at R20 million, with the contribution of the incumbent 
not to exceed 50% of this, but has been uncapped since 2001 (Msimang, 2006, pp. 225-6). Payments are collected by 
ICASA, but handed over to National Treasury and not accounted for to USAASA. No financial statement in respect 
of the fund seems ever to have been issued. A recent attempt to ascertain the current balance in the fund produced 
a speculated estimate of around R1 billion (Perry, 2010, p. 19). However, an earlier USAASA annual report suggests 
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that the total contributions to the fund between 1999 and 2008 amounted to R636 million6  (USAASA, 2008, p. 14) – 
suggesting that Perry’s figure is likely to be an under-estimate. Substantial levels of funding towards UAS have thus 
clearly been available for a number of years.
The fund has been under-utilised, with reported expenditure by 2008 totalling a mere R227 million (USAASA, 
2008, p. 14) – just over 35% of the amount available - leaving an unspent surplus of R409 million. Not only has expenditure 
been minimal, it has been ineffective. Initially the fund was used to fund a series of telecentres, in contravention of its 
formal legal mandate. The Agency’s own consultants’ report comments that the “Agency, which had not [sic] mandate or 
authority to undertake implementation projects, nonetheless made implementation its core function” (USA, 2005, p. 93).
The performance of these telecentres has been substandard. By 2000 only 65 telecentres had been established. 
Furthermore, 32% were found in 2001 to be no longer operational, with “less than half (47 per cent) … [having] both 
computers and phones working, though all had been provided with this equipment at the start” (Benjamin, 2003, p. 5). 
By 2005 the programme had been downscaled. With only 111 of the original target of 4 000 telecentres established, 
the focus then shifted to the rollout of “Cyberlabs7”  and “Community Digital Hubs8”  (USA, 2005, p. 77ff). A recent 
USAASA annual report suggests little change, with expenditure directed “to rehabilitate and equip Community Access 
Centres, Cyberlabs in schools and Digital Hubs; to enable internet connectivity in [further education and training 
institutions]; to subsidise USALS; to teach ICT skills to personnel who manage these centres; to conduct research that 
will inform USAF and for special projects such as Mindset Network and Square Kilometre Array” (USAASA, 2009, p. 17).
A summary of income and expenditure is shown in Figure 4 below. It appears that the fund’s track record is less than 
illustrious, with expenditure being inappropriate, ineffective, and often wasteful, leaving a massive unspent surplus 
totalling nearly two thirds of contributions.
 FIGURE 4:  UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND: INCOME & EXPENDITURE (1998-2010)9 
 
	 Source:		 USAASA,	2008,	updated	with	information	from	USAASA,	2010
 
UNDER-SERVICED AREA LICENSEES (USALS)
The final pillar of the UAS interventions discussed in this paper is the USALs. Essentially a rural operator model, 
it aimed to fulfil many of the criteria articulated by Dymond and Oestman (2003), including market orientation, 
technology neutrality and asymmetrical pricing. It seeks to leverage market forces, creating an incentivised licensing 
regime aimed at addressing the “market efficiency gap”. Furthermore, the 27 designated under-serviced areas cover 
a substantial proportion (47%) of South Africa’s population (Gillwald, 2006, p. 7), confirming the importance of the 
intervention. However, this intervention, too, has been problematic.
Several commentators recognised the need for the USALs to be supported by a range of policy and regulatory measures 
for their success. Gillwald put forward several critical success factors required to ensure viability and “sustainability” 
of the USALs, including a “funding framework … an asymmetrical interconnection regime … a flexible low-cost 
regulatory regime; and a licensing process that is kept as simple as possible” (Gillwald, 2002, p. 1).
6	 2009/2010	compliance	reports	put	the	combined	contribution	for	major	telecoms	licensees	at	ZAR	218	million.
7	 Effectively	computer	laboratories	in	schools.
8	 There	is	no	definition	of	what	Community	Digital	Hubs	are	or	what	distinguishes	them	from	telecentres.
9	 No	official	figure	for	contributions	since	2008/9	is	available,	although	a	perusal	of	selected	licensee	compliance	reports	submitted	to	ICASA	suggests	that	
at	least	ZAR437	000	000	was	collected	in	2010.
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However, only funding support for USALs was put in place, pegged at an unreasonably low ZAR5 million per annum 
over three years, subject to performance reporting. This compares unfavourably with estimated start-up capital 
requirements in the order of USD5 to USD20 million (Gillwald, 2006, p. 10)). A review of the first seven licensed 
USALs found this amount to be woefully inadequate, recommending that it be “increased substantially … and that 
operating expenditure and capital expenditure be availed and administered separately” (Thornton, 2006, p. 2). It is 
thus clear that the USALs received insufficient support to succeed, even though abundant financial resources were 
available for this purpose.
A complex range of other factors mitigated against the viability of the USALs. Consistent with Dymond and Oestman 
(2003), both Thornton (2006) and Gillwald (2006) argued in favour of cost-based termination rates, with the latter 
specifically arguing that without “cost-based asymmetrical termination charges … that [recognise] the asymmetrical 
cost of terminating calls in … low-density, high cost rural areas … a sustainable business case cannot be made for 
USALs” (Gillwald, 2006, pp. 11-12). No such interconnection regime was ever implemented.
There were also inbuilt structural disadvantages in the ownership requirements foisted on the USALs. They were 
required to be small business operations, with participation and ownership by historically-disadvantaged groups, 
putting them at a significant disadvantage in terms of technical expertise and managerial skills. The limitation 
on foreign ownership to a maximum of 25% further mitigated against their ability to attract investors (Gillwald, 
2006). None of these requirements implies failure on its own – in fact, several align with important national policy 
objectives. However, in combination they created a set of structural constraints that guaranteed technical and 
commercial failure. Suggestions that a comprehensive capacity-building programme be put in place to address some 
of these deficiencies were never implemented.
  
The market structure and environment also undermined the viability of the USALs. For instance, the determination 
of the 27 under-serviced areas was based on outdated fixed-line teledensity data (Gillwald, 2006 p. 7) without 
reference to mobile penetration, which had surpassed fixed-line teledensity by the time the first licences were issued. 
This put the USALs in a position of competing for shares in a market of unknown saturation, rather than for the 
entire market as in the case of the analogous Chilean experiment (Wellenius, 2002). Furthermore, permitting only 
limited mobility for the USALs disadvantaged them in competition with fully mobile services. Finally, the subsequent 
Ministerial determinations liberalising the VoIP market, permitting resale and opening the door to self-provisioning 
(DoC, 2004), further cut the ground from under the USAL business case.
 
The eventual fate of the USALs is not clear. Several became mobile resellers (Lowman, 2005). Thornton concluded 
that “without significant intervention … most if not all of the USALs will not survive” (2006, pp. 1-2). By early 2008 
USAASA noted that none of the original seven licensees was yet operational, opining that only three remained 
potentially viable (Senne, 2008b). Yet, barely four months earlier the Minister, while issuing a series of policy 
directions, had included a bizarre injunction to ICASA: “where there is more than one licence in a province, [to] 
merge the licences and issue one Provincial Under-Serviced Area Network Operator (PUSANO) licence” (DoC, 2007, 
p. 9). This would have forced the two remaining potentially viable operators each to merge with another, non-viable 
licensee. No subsequent progress seems to have been made with these enforced mergers. The final knell for USALs 
was sounded when the incoming Minister conceded that the “concept and the possible remedy had not worked” 
(Vecchiatto, 2009) and scrapped the decision to merge USALs into PUSANOs (DoC, 2009).
 
The USALs thus became an unfortunate historical footnote to UAS in South Africa. They were never provided with 
the necessary enabling regulatory and business environment, and were overtaken by events as policy moved on, 
vitiating the model. It is regrettable that an experiment so innovative was doomed to fail so dismally.
IMPACT OF UAS INTERVENTIONS
For South Africa it is now effectively 20 years from the RDP’s clarion call to “provide universal affordable access for 
all as rapidly as possible” (ANC, 1994). To what extent can the country be said to have achieved universal access to 
telecommunications services?
 
The analysis set out above suggests that the main planks of South Africa’s UAS policy have contributed little to the 
upsurge in access in a country where uptake has instead tilted dramatically towards mobile telephony, a clearly 
defined global trend. South Africa’s fixed-line USOs have been ineffective in increasing access. The additional USOs 
imposed on the mobile operators in 2004 do not reflect recognition of the market shift towards mobile, but rather 
a requirement for a perfunctory quid pro quo. No evidence of such a shift in thinking exists and the lackadaisical 
enforcement of the additional USOs suggests their strategic importance was never recognised.
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While it may be argued that the USOs in respect of signal coverage for mobile were an enabler, it is likely that the 
innovation of mobile prepaid services introduced by MTN in 1996, and emulated by Vodacom, enabled the market to 
mushroom on the mobile platform, with prepaid mobile subscribers making up 83.8% of South Africa’s mobile users 
by 2007.10  Other research (Hodge, 2005; Kalba, 2008) has similarly identified the impact of prepaid, along with other 
contextual factors, as a key driver of mobile diffusion.
The impact of this shift is illustrated by data from the 2011 Census (Stats SA, 2013) which shows that 88.9% of 
households have “access to” a cellphone, with provincial variations ranging from 93,8% in industrialised Gauteng to 
81,9% in impoverished, mostly rural Northern Cape. Broken down by racial categorisation – with the racially-based 
chasm in access to telephony being one of the central justifications for South Africa’s pre-eminent focus on UAS – 
the discrepancy ranges from 96,1% household penetration for “Whites” to 83,7% for “Coloureds”. This suggests that 
despite remaining discrepancies, the mobile explosion has been a great leveller of the digital divide that impelled South 
Africa’s commitment to UAS. By contrast, enormous discrepancies in fixed-line access remain, with household penetration 
ranging from a high of 18% in Gauteng to a low of 3,8% in impoverished, mostly rural Limpopo, and penetration by racial 
categorisation ranging from a high of 61,9% for “Indian / Asian” households to 5,9% for “Black” households.
 
This analysis implies the failure of fixed-line USOs and the success of market structure and dynamics as key drivers 
in dealing with the digital divide inherited from apartheid.
 
The Universal Service Agency and Universal Service Fund interventions did not contribute to the upsurge of mobile 
access. Likewise, the USAL experiment contributed only failure. The USA was largely ineffectual, while the USF 
engaged in ineffective attempts to fund a variety of forms of Internet rather than telephony access. The critique 
here is twofold. Firstly, telephony access including mobile access should have been prioritised in the early years of 
operation of the fund, laying the foundation for Internet access and broadband access. Secondly, the various Internet 
access projects, telecentres in particular, were poorly conceived and badly operationalised. 
 
Though South Africa remains far from achieving universal service in respect of fixed-line telephony, a problem for 
extending fixed broadband; it has achieved universal service in mobile telecommunications, given mobile teledensity 
of 126%. Even if one treats the figures with caution, and applies qualifications and allowances for multiple SIM-card 
ownership (Sutherland, 2009; Goldstuck, 2009), these figures suggest around 42 million mobile users, a mobile per 
capita teledensity of 72%,11  an impressive penetration rate for a middle-income developing country – and arguably 
close to universal mobile service.
 
CONCLUSION
The imperative towards achieving universal access and service for political, social and economic reasons is one that 
South Africa shares with many developing countries, one that remains widely applicable across sub-Saharan Africa. 
As we saw at the outset, South Africa was perhaps uniquely placed by virtue of its history to accord UAS pride of 
place in its ICT sector reform policies and interventions. To its credit the country did so, imposing universal service 
obligations upon all licensed operators, establishing a dedicated quasi-regulatory entity to drive UAS, creating a USF 
to fund UAS interventions, and licensing under-serviced area operators.
 
Each of these interventions is either derived from or consonant with international best practice in respect of UAS 
policy and regulation. Yet each seems to have been ineffective at best, making little if any impact on the dramatic 
upsurge of access to mobile telephony that has characterised South Africa’s ICT sector. It would accordingly appear 
that sector dynamics and market forces were far more responsible for increased levels of UAS than specifically-
targeted policy and regulation.
Such a failure of policy to make an impact could perhaps be accounted for by disjunctures in the domestic application 
of international best practice, due for example to the vicissitudes of policy transfer (Chulajata & Turner, 2009). It may 
also point to failures of institutional capacity in South Africa’s regulatory institutions, such as skills constraints, 
poor policy co-ordination or lack of ongoing research to inform policy implementation. Alternatively, it may point to 
problems with international best practice itself, or suggest the need for implementation of UAS intervention that is 
dramatically more flexible, responsive and open to dynamic adjustment in the face of shifting technology and market 
trends than anything hitherto attempted, noting new trends in mobile access and mobile broadband.
 
The problems documented here in respect of South Africa’s quest to achieve UAS have implications for other countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and for policymakers and regulators in other developing countries that face similar challenges 
and constraints, and who will need to think innovatively about the application of universal service funds and other 
10	 Source:	Annual	Reports	of	MTN	and	Vodacom	and	Cell	C	press	statements.
11	 The	census	figures	cited	above	reflect	access	at	a	household	level	–	arguably	a	less	valid	measure	of	UAS	than	per	capita	figures	in	the	case	of	a	highly	
personalised,	reluctantly	shared	device	like	a	cellphone,	except,	perhaps,	in	poorer	communities.
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UAS interventions. For most developing countries universal access to telephony services by means of mobile is 
the current and central preoccupation of UAS policy, and correctly so. But should they abandon the attempt to 
implement international best practice in respect of UAS policy and regulation, and turn their trust instead to market 
forces alone? Or does international best practice need to be adjusted in the light of the lessons of the South African 
experience? What are the implications of these lessons for the future of USOs and USFs?
 
Also, what are the implications of these lessons for countries moving on from a focus on mobile towards consideration 
of UAS in respect of broadband and the Internet? South Africa’s latest draft broadband policy, for example, has 
universal access and service as a primary focus, and discusses in some detail the role of USAASA, the USAF and 
USOs in the rollout of broadband infrastructure and services. As this analysis has shown, broadband USOs that are 
formulated in the narrow, technology-specific manner of their predecessors would, in all likelihood, be doomed to 
failure. The track record of both the USAF and USAASA suggest that their intervention, unless carefully reconfigured, 
is likely to be ineffectual at best, and open to opportunities for corruption at worst. An approach is required that is 
more research-based, flexible, agile and responsive to changing circumstances.
Such considerations, and the questions that underpin them, point to the need for further research in the critically 
important area of universal access and service, and in respect of the interventions designed to achieve this key 
developmental goal.
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